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INTRODUCTION
We live in a time when concerns about influence over the American political process by powerful private interests have reached an apogee, both on the left and on the right. Among the 
laws originally intended to fight excessive private influence over republican 
institutions were the antitrust laws of the 1890–1914 period, whose sponsors 
were concerned with monopoly, particularly its influence over legislatures 
and politicians. While no one would claim that the antitrust laws were meant 
to be comprehensive anticorruption laws, there can be little question that 
they were passed with concerns about the political influence of powerful 
firms and industry cartels.
Since the 1960s, however, the scrutiny of corrupt and deceptive political 
practices inherent to antitrust law has been sharply limited by the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine,1 which provides immunity to antitrust liability for conduct 
that can be characterized as political or legal advocacy.2
The Noerr case was strained when it was decided, and it has not aged 
well. As an interpretation of the antitrust laws, it ignored congressional con-
cern with political mischief undertaken by conspiracy or monopoly. Its legit-
imacy has always rested on avoidance of the First Amendment, and while 
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Noerr itself may have legitimately reflected such avoidance, the subsequent 
growth of a Noerr immunity has blown past any First Amendment-driven 
defense of its existence. For that reason, some have suggested a reformu-
lation of the doctrine.3 The better answer is that, lacking constitutional or 
statutory foundation, Noerr should be overruled. 
The First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech, assembly, and “to 
petition the government for a redress of grievances.”4 It therefore protects 
efforts to influence political debate as well as legitimate petitioning in leg-
islative, judicial, or administrative processes.5 The First Amendment does 
not, however, create a right to bribe government officials, deceive agencies, 
file false statements, or abuse government process through repeated filings 
designed only to injure a competitor. Nonetheless, each of these activities 
has, in some courts at least, been granted immunity under the overgrown 
Noerr immunity.6 For these reasons, it is an extraconstitutional outlier ripe 
for reexamination. 
The case for overruling Noerr is buttressed by the fact that, since its deci-
sion, Noerr’s theoretical foundations have become “wobbly” and “moth-eat-
en.”7 Written before the dawn of public choice theory or contemporary 
understanding of interest group influence, Noerr relies on an exceptionally 
stylized model of politics that understates the potential for corruption and 
the denial of majority will. 8 
After several decades, moreover, the judge-made immunity has begun 
to creep far beyond its original justifications—a well-known problem for doc-
trines anchored in avoidance (so-called “avoidance creep”).9 Constitutional 
avoidance, as Charlotte Garden argues, yields decisions that deliberately 
interpret the statute in a manner at odds with congressional intent. Subse-
quent decisions building on that interpretation can easily leave behind both 
congressional intent and the original justifications for the avoidance.10 The 
result is a free-floating doctrine, as with Noerr, that becomes untethered to 
both statutory goals and constitutional principle. 
Overruling Noerr would not make political petitioning illegal. It would, 
instead, require defendants to rely on the First Amendment itself (and not 
Noerr) when seeking to defend what would otherwise be conduct that is 
illegal under the antitrust laws. Doctrinally, this is to force courts to address 
whether conduct in question is actually an antitrust violation and, if so, 
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whether it is protected by the First Amendment or not, drawing on an estab-
lished jurisprudence for some of the problems presented in the Noerr context. 
For example, while the First Amendment protects false statements in some 
contexts,11 it has never protected perjury or the making of false statements 
to government agencies.12 It should take no great leap of insight to conclude 
that the First Amendment might be the superior vehicle for adjudging a 
defendant’s First Amendment interests.13 
Noerr could be overruled by the Supreme Court in an appropriate case. 
It could also be overruled by Congress. The legislature, of course, is not in a 
position to overrule the aspects of Noerr immunity that are anchored in the 
First Amendment.14 But Congress could do what this article calls for: namely, 
return the immunities granted political speech and petitioning to their 
constitutional limits while reaffirming the purposes of the antitrust laws.
Part I outlines where Noerr itself went wrong; Part II details the problem 
of doctrinal creep; Part III argues that Noerr should be overruled; and Part 
IV details what a First Amendment replacement would look like.
I. WHERE NOERR WENT WRONG
The Noerr litigation arose out of a long-running battle that stretched from the 1930s through the 1950s between two natural competitors: the railroad and the trucking industries, whose mutual 
animosity was the stuff of legend. The railroads, the older of the two indus-
tries, had already had many run-ins with the antitrust laws.15 By the 1930s 
the railroads began to suffer from the competitive inroads being made by 
the newer trucking industry. In response, the railroads began a series of 
anti-truck campaigns to hold their market position by any means necessary.
The railroads began using a technique that was relatively new to the 
business world: a public relations campaign piloted through front groups 
and promulgated through the mass media. Among the front groups used were 
the “Empire State Transport League,” the “Save Our Highways Clubs,” and 
the “New Jersey Tax Study Foundation.”16 These groups portrayed truckers 
as villainous creatures whose driving of heavy vehicles destroyed bridges, 
fractured roads, and created other public dangers. As the Supreme Court 
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found, the campaign was “made to appear as spontaneously expressed 
views of independent persons and civic groups when, in fact, it was largely 
prepared and produced by [a PR firm] and paid for by the railroads.”17 The 
Court summarized the approach as a “deception of the public, manufacture 
of bogus sources of reference, [and] distortion of public sources of informa-
tion.”18 The trial judge wrote that he preferred “to treat the whole procedure 
in its true light, which is the technique of the ‘Big Lie.’”19
Unseemly as they may have been, however, the campaigns were unques-
tionably legislative campaigns. The railroads had clear, if anticompetitive, 
political goals: to lower the statutory weight limits that kept truckers out 
of heavy transport and to increase the taxes truckers paid. To that end, the 
front groups presented data (allegedly false, though we don’t know for sure) 
that, they claimed, revealed the damage done by trucks to roads and bridges. 
And they deceived the government, said the district court, by hiding just 
who was behind the presention of the information.20 As suggested already, 
the complaints were made to seem as if they were from disinterested third 
parties and concerned citizens when, in fact, they were not. 
As a First Amendment case, Noerr is not an easy one. The railroads 
have in their favor that they were associating to engage in political speech, 
to present information relevant to government, and to ask for changes in 
the law. As the Supreme Court put it, “No one denies that the railroads 
were making a genuine effort to influence legislation and law enforcement 
practices.”21 If it was true that the truckers were damaging public roads that 
was speech of of public value. And as the Court stated, a rule that would 
“disqualify people from taking a public position on matters in which they 
are financially interested would thus deprive the government of a valuable 
source of information.”22
The trickier part comes from the deception: the use of the front groups 
to deceive government as to the source of the information presented and the 
allegation that the information provided was false. The crime of making false 
statements to government is routinely prosecuted.23 Any First Amendment 
defense would be particularly challenging if the plaintiffs intentionally 
and maliciously submitted false information to achieve an anticompetitive 
result—fraud on the legislature—and therefore were like the applicant who 
submits false information to obtain a patent.24 But if Noerr was just a case 
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of creating a false impression of public support, something that is certainly 
unethical but happens in public discourse with distressing regularity, the 
question remains difficult. 
Leaving the First Amendment aside, what was the proper construction 
of the Sherman Act? Imagine the same case without government as the target 
of the campaign. It seems implausible that the Sherman Act would grant 
automatic immunity in a case in which an industry conspires to exclude a 
competitor by manipulating a body with the power to determine the condi-
tions of competition. An effort to hamstring a rival by rigging a process to set 
exclusionary standards mirrors the conduct condemned in cases like Allied 
Tube v. Indian Head, Inc.25 and Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.26 It is the 
kind of thing meant for a rule of reason analysis: as Justice Brandeis wrote 
in Chicago Board of Trade, the question would be whether the conduct is 
such that it “promotes competition, or whether it is such as may suppress 
or even destroy competition ... .”27 Perhaps the railroads would have argued 
the weight limits were competition-enhancing in some way; it seems more 
likely that they were a bad-faith effort to exclude their competitors.
Though Noerr did involve bodies of government, it did not involve a 
standard-setting body. That could lead some to believe that the campaigns, 
even if deceptive, are still not the kind of thing that the Sherman Act or 
other antitrust laws were intended to have jurisdiction over. Yet even the 
most cursory tour of the history of the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade 
Commission Acts reveals that this view of Congress’s aims in passing the 
antitrust laws is grossly mistaken. 
The famous editorial cartoons of the Standard Oil Octopus depict its 
tentacles encircling legislatures.28 Among the abuses of which companies 
like Standard Oil and, later, J.P. Morgan’s New Haven railroad were accused 
was the bribing of public officials to disadvantage smaller competitors or 
to wrongly grant monopoly status.29 The legislative history is replete with 
evidence of such concerns.30 As Robert Faulkner writes, “there is nothing on 
the face of the [Sherman] Act to suggest that the Fifty-first Congress wanted 
to exempt concerted, unethical and anti-competitive activity.” He adds that 
it would be strange to do so “on the ironic premise that the Act permits a 
business combination to destroy or do grievous harm to a competitor by 
applying large sums of money to deceive elected officials.”31 
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The best reading of the Sherman and Clayton Acts is that the framers had 
an overarching concern about monopoly influence over democratic institu-
tions, but also a more specific concern with the obtaining or maintaining of 
monopoly through corrupt means, especially through bribery or fraud.32 For 
that reason, whether in pursuit of monopolization or the restraint of trade, 
corruption and fraud on the government ought to be understood as one form 
of prohibited conduct. 
If that is so, it leads to the conclusion that Noerr must be understood as 
an exercise in constitutional avoidance, a conclusion many other scholars 
have also reached; or alternatively, that the deception wasn’t quite bad 
enough to amount to fraud on the legislature.33 That ambiguity is what 
makes the case frustrating, for despite Justice Black’s bold writing, the Noerr 
opinion, by inventing an immunity instead of resolving the question, took 
the easy way out. 
At this point we need to briefly address an alternative view of Noerr that 
has nothing to do with the First Amendment but has shown up in Supreme 
Court opinions. That view holds Noerr to be a necessary implication of Parker 
immunity (and therefore, potentially, independent of the First Amendment). 
Parker stands for the proposition that state action is immune from antitrust 
scrutiny.34 Hence, if the federal authorities, or even the states, decide to 
establish a monopoly, that act would nonetheless not constitute a violation 
of the antitrust laws. That has led some—most notably Justice Scalia—to 
suggest that Noerr immunity is simply “a corollary to Parker” because as it 
is within the rights of government to act anticompetitively, “the federal anti-
trust laws also do not regulate the conduct of private individuals in seeking 
anticompetitive action from the government.”35
If superficially appealing, this logic evaporates on further inspection. To 
pursue monopoly is not the same thing as to pursue it corruptly, but the view 
just described brushes over the difference. As already discussed, the framers 
of the Sherman Act considered the activity of corruptly seeking state-granted 
monopolies to be within the concerns of the law, especially through bribery, 
threats, or deception. Even if government can override the antitrust laws, it 
does not necessarily follow that the courts need immunize efforts to obtain 
state action, especially if they should go beyond the normal protections for 
advocacy provided by the First Amendment. 
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This conclusion is reinforced by examining immunities outside of the 
antitrust context where there is no such blanket “corollary” to be found. 
The government, unlike a private citizen, has special immunities when 
it puts people to death or seizes property. Yet those seeking to convince 
government to use those powers enjoy no special immunity to bribery laws, 
lobbying laws, or other criminal prohibitions. They have, instead, only the 
protections for political advocacy that come from the First Amendment. The 
existence of a government power has, outside of antitrust, never been read 
as a license to pursue it using independently illegal means. It all returns to 
the question of what the First Amendment protects, which returns us to the 
case for overruling Noerr.
These are conclusions that are further buttressed by the Court’s recogni-
tion of a sham exception in Noerr.36 Were Noerr meant to be the perfect mirror 
image of Parker, it might be thought that any purported effort to influence 
government, no matter how distasteful, might be thought to be immunized. 
But the sham exception better suggests First Amendment avoidance, because 
it tracks the well-known position that the First Amendment has limits and 
does not protect everything that might plausibly be described as speech or 
petitioning. The sham exception looks very much like a placeholder for the 
limits of the First Amendment. Just as conduct falsely claiming to be speech 
is not protected by the First Amendment, anticompetitive activity falsely 
claiming to be political petitioning is not afforded undue protection.37 
Additional cases finding fraud on the government to be actionable 
under the antitrust laws support the idea that Noerr relied on constitutional 
avoidance. In Walker Process, a party was alleged to have intentionally lied 
to the patent office about the state of the “prior art” so as to obtain a patent.38 
The Court declined to create any special immunity for such conduct, instead 
stating that “the enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent 
Office may be violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act provided the other elements 
necessary to a §2 case are present.”39 That result impeaches any idea that 
the Sherman Act was not meant to reach efforts to defraud government for 
anticompetitive purposes.
All this suggests that while constitutional avoidance may be appropriate 
in some cases, it was mistaken in Noerr, because Noerr was hardly a one-off. It 
gave birth to a judge-made immunity and in the process left a critical matter 
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undetermined: whether a court, invoking Noerr, need rely on constitutional 
avoidance to do so, and thereby conduct a First Amendment analysis, or 
whether it was free to just invoke Noerr as a free-floating immunity. The latter 
would, in time, allow the immunity to expand far beyond any constitutional 
or statutory mandate. 
A different way of stating the critique is this: Noerr does not give the 
courts the tools or mandate to address the competing values of the First 
Amendment and the antitrust laws in the cases it addresses. Unlike, say, the 
overlap between patent and antitrust, where the conflict is made explicit, 
it was instead buried by constitutional avoidance. That burial would lead 
the courts to expand the immunity in directions entirely unrelated to First 
Amendment values, a matter to which we now turn.
The Relationship between the First Amendment 
and Antitrust Laws
The antitrust laws and the First Amendment have shared goals. Both laws 
envision open societies and have their anchors in liberty. Both take as their 
device the promotion of competition in actual or metaphorical markets. And 
both have been justified as means for preventing abuses of power, whether 
by government or the monopolist. There is even some similarity in their 
methods: What is censorship if not the exclusion of a competitor from the 
marketplace of ideas?40 
As laws serving roughly the same ends with similar philosophies, it 
might seem unlikely that the laws might come into conflict. But the tension 
we have seen arises from the fact that, as Noerr and similar cases show, 
the First Amendment blesses conduct—petitioning—that can be used to 
obtain anticompetitive ends. But as the First Amendment does not protect 
everything that might conceivably be called speech, it is important to take 
a closer look at just what speech values are implicated in political influence 
campaigns. 
Imagine that the coal industry were concerned with the rise of wind 
power, an obvious competitor. It might react in more than one way. First, the 
coal industry or its owners might distribute information (here assumed to be 
factual) showing that wind power, in fact, creates its own waste problems 
or is more expensive than generally thought. It might distribute information 
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suggesting that coal is not actually as polluting as widely believed, promot-
ing the concept of “clean coal.” And it might formally petition government 
with economic arguments for abandoning the subsidization of wind power. 
These activities are all within the core of First Amendment protection. By 
providing information to government and the public relevant to an important 
debate, they serve the process of democratic self-government, both through 
the formation of public opinion and the provision of information necessary 
to making important public decisions.41 It is true that the volume of speech 
that the coal industry can afford might be said to give its speech an unfair 
advantage; yet as it stands, the First Amendment has stood for the premise 
that more is better in that context.42 
So much for a “clean” campaign of political influence that relies on the 
publication of factual information, correctly attributed. What about when 
the campaign becomes increasingly deceptive, corrupt, and abusive? The 
answer is that the First Amendment interests weaken until, at some point, 
they disappear entirely. This is key to understanding the First Amendment 
-antitrust analysis and a point largely neglected by Noerr and its Supreme 
Court progeny: not all the techniques of political influence are “speech” or 
petitioning at all. 
The coal industry might, as in Noerr, use front groups who lie about 
their funding to present its criticism of wind power, thereby deceiving the 
public and government as to the source of the critiques. Industry might also 
publish demonstrably false or even defamatory information, such as the 
suggestion that wind turbines are highly harmful to human health (“wind 
power syndrome”).43 Finally, the coal industry might intentionally and 
maliciously present false information—say, false pricing information or the 
defamation of individuals involved in wind—in its petitions to government. 
It might file endless procedural challenges to block the approval of wind 
farms by local authorities. Finally, it might give cash bribes to government 
officials in exchange for a local ban on wind power. At the extreme, it might 
hire thugs to sabotage wind turbines under the cover of darkness.
As we run through these increasingly dirty advocacy campaigns, the 
First Amendment interests become progressively weaker to the point of being 
nonexistent. Laws that ban bribery, defamation, deception of government, 
and sabotage have all survived First Amendment challenges, either based 
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on the strength of the government interest or the idea that there really is no 
protected speech at issue, but merely conduct.44
On the antitrust side of the ledger, the strength of the government’s 
interests would similarly seem to depend on deception through outright 
corruption. Despite occasional academic suggestions that the antitrust laws 
should be indifferent to anticompetitive intent or malicious conduct, the 
nature of the conduct matters, as evidenced by case law condemning inten-
tional monopolization,45 deception,46 and other tortious conduct like fraud 
or sabotage.
What is needed, is something that courts do regularly, namely, balance 
the respective interests protected by the First Amendment and antitrust 
laws, respectively.
And that is what is completely lacking in Noerr: any consideration of 
the relative strengths of the First Amendment and antitrust interests. And 
as we shall see, it has led the courts—especially district courts—to extend 
Noerr immunity beyond any defensible boundary.
II. LEAVING THE CONSTITUTION BEHIND
If it might originally have been defended as an exercise in con-stitutional avoidance, the Noerr doctrine has over the decades grown into its own creature, too unconnected and insensitive to the competing 
concerns of antitrust policy and the First Amendment. At its worst, it has 
provided immunities to classes of conduct, like bribery, abuse of government 
process, and lying to government, that the antitrust laws were obviously 
meant to punish and for which there are no constitutional protections.
The 1991 decision City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. did 
the most to make the doctrine insensitive to the competing concerns in this 
area.47 The jury had found a corrupt conspiracy between the city of Colum-
bia, South Carolina, and a local billboard company. Even though the First 
Amendment does not generally protect conspiracies, Justice Scalia’s majority 
nonetheless held the conduct to be protected by Noerr.48 The key doctrinal 
move in Omni was to limit Noerr’s sham exception—which as we have seen 
can be understood as a proxy for the First Amendment’s limits. The Court 
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limited it to one category of sham: bad-faith abuse of the political process, 
and declined to find any other possible exceptions, such as the “conspiracy” 
exception found by the court of appeals. Given that the sham exception can 
be understood as standing in for the limits of the First Amendment, Omni 
gave courts an open door to use Noerr to protect conduct that would not be 
protected by the First Amendment.
Since that time, Noerr has, in lower courts, come to protect a range of 
conduct unprotected by the Constitution, including not just conspiracy but 
also bribery, false statements to government, deceit, and even abuse of pro-
cess—so long as some political objective can be claimed. Overbroad Noerr 
immunity and an under-inclusive sham exception made courts reluctant to 
recognize areas of clearly anticompetitive action that should not enjoy any 
constitutional protection.
Consider the following example of how Noerr is invoked to immunize 
bribery. In 2001, a district court in Louisiana heard allegations that a river-
boat company was bribing government officials so as to prevent competitors 
from obtaining a license to operate.49 The court rejected the idea that “brib-
ery, extortion and corruption” would “abrogate antitrust immunity.”50 It did 
so based on the premise that even corrupt and criminal activity is immune 
from antitrust scrutiny under Omni so long as the ultimate object is a favor-
able political outcome.51
In another departure from First Amendment principle, some courts 
have also interpreted Noerr to protect the making of false statements to 
government. For example, in a 2013 dispute between two asphalt firms, one 
alleged that the other had lied to municipal governments about the relevant 
regulations so as to trick the governments into excluding rivals.52 When tar-
geted in an antitrust suit, the court upheld immunity,53 despite the analogy 
to obtaining a fraudulent patent condemned in Walker Process,54 as well as 
evidence of effects on competition, and the fact that the First Amendment, 
with rare exceptions, does not protect false statements made to government.
Finally, some courts have unaccountably immunized conduct that is 
nearly impossible to describe as political speech or petitioning (conduct 
that Noerr itself named as unprotected): the use of the political process as 
an anticompetitive weapon, such as through repetitive, baseless filings. 
Even when the goal of the filing is for “the principle purpose of harming [a] 
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competitor,” courts have at times refused to consider the filing a sham.55 
Courts have protected series of filings that petitioners never expected to win 
on.56 Similarly, they have fully ignored the distinction between standards 
for single and multiple filings and insisted on firm proof of “objective unrea-
sonableness” for each action despite the obvious increased harm that comes 
from fielding many specious claims.57
Other examples of dubious extensions to Noerr include an immunity 
premised on the communication of a list of school accreditations to the 
state,58 secret meetings at a governor’s mansion,59 and even boycotting 
competitors.60 At the risk of stating the obvious, the First Amendment value 
served by immunizing such conduct is unclear at best.
It is worth pointing out that not every court has ignored the First Amend-
ment foundations of the Noerr doctrine.61 Courts have sometimes insisted on 
a First Amendment analysis prior to granting Noerr immunity. For example, 
consider the litigation from the early 2000s centered on allegations that a 
drug manufacturer sought to delay the entry of competitive generic drugs 
by wrongly listing its patent in the FDA’s orange book.62 In rejecting a Noerr 
defense, the district court agreed with the Federal Trade Commission that 
the listing was not a petition protected by the First Amendment and was 
therefore not entitled to Noerr immunity. It did so on the premise that, as the 
FTC argued, the FDA’s decisions to list the patents in the orange book were 
ministerial as opposed to discretionary; there is no Noerr immunity when the 
“government does not perform any independent review of the validity of the 
statements, does not make or issue any intervening judgment and instead 
acts in direct reliance on the private party’s representations.”63 Similarly, the 
FTC, at least, believes that misrepresentative communications to government 
are not protected by the First Amendment and also not protected by Noerr.64
This might be a fine approach if followed generally, but it is not; the very 
inconsistency strengthens the case for overruling Noerr. While the approach 
of the cases just discussed is the better one, nothing obliges a court to follow 
this formula when deciding a case, and the Supreme Court itself has ignored 
it.65 Hence, until Noerr is overruled, the immunities that attach to speech 
and petition will remain a hodgepodge of immunity associated with First 
Amendment protections that is purely judge-made and inconsistent with 
the anticorruption purposes of the Sherman Act
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III. REASONS TO OVERRULE NOERR
The problem of Noerr’s expansion is hardly unrecognized by commentators.66 Even Robert Bork’s Antitrust Paradox, not generally understood as a manual for vigorous antitrust enforcement, suggested 
that Noerr had gone too far in its licensing of anticompetitive conduct.67 
There have, over the years, been several prominent calls for courts to adjust 
or narrow the Noerr doctrine,68 including a study by the FTC in 2006,69 but 
the calls for substantive reform have had influence only at the margins.70
If it can be accepted that Noerr has gone beyond any defensible basis in 
the First Amendment, there are three good reasons to overrule it. The first 
and most obvious is the duty of the courts to apply the Sherman Act and 
similar laws as Congress intended. The text of the statute does not contain 
exceptions for seeking monopolization or restraint of trade through govern-
mental means. And as suggested earlier, the legislative history of the antitrust 
laws does not suggest a Congress that wanted to exempt bribery, deception, 
or other abuses from antitrust scrutiny.71 Noerr has therefore prevented 
government from confronting some of the problems that the antitrust laws 
were meant to solve.
The second reason to overrule Noerr is to ensure greater consistency in 
the courts. As it stands, some courts consider First Amendment limits when 
deciding Noerr cases, but others feel free to treat Noerr as a free-floating 
doctrine that can be extended regardless of its basis in the First Amendment. 
The current approach is a recipe for inconsistency and circuit splits. 
When facing a case involving alleged political activity, a court would 
break the analysis into its constituent parts, so that it becomes obvious 
whether any given ruling is statutory or constitutional. One would first ask 
whether the conduct in question represents an activity that Congress meant 
to prohibit in Section 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act, Section 3 or 7 of the Clayton 
Act, or Section 5 of the FTC Act. Once that is done, the court can then con-
sider whether the conduct is nonetheless protected by the First Amendment, 
relying on established First Amendment doctrine. Doing this would not allow 
courts to mix the issues and consequently avoid analysis of either. 
The third reason is related: maintaining the coherence of the respective 
constitutional and statutory doctrines. Because Noerr does not clearly call 
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for either, it creates a pronounced danger of doctrinal creep.72 To the extent 
that protected speech or petitioning under the First Amendment is impli-
cated, the First Amendment’s own jurisprudence is best suited to provide 
an answer. To the degree that hard statutory questions are presented—just 
when is anticompetitive bribery a violation of the FTC Act?—such questions 
should be answered, as opposed to brushed away with a citation to Noerr. 
An alternative to overruling Noerr is to demand that courts consider the 
First Amendment in the course of applying Noerr immunity. This is better 
than the current state of affairs but has the problem of being too convoluted. 
Take the bribery case described earlier. It would require the court, in the 
midst of an antitrust analysis, to consider the scope of any constitutional 
right to bribery, potentially to create a bribery exception (or to expand the 
sham exception) and then return to the antitrust point. It is simpler, as is 
the normal style, to assess whether the conduct in question violates the law 
and, if so, whether it is nonetheless protected by the First Amendment and 
then, if so, whether the government’s interests outweigh the speech interests.
The doctrine of stare decisis might be read to caution against overruling 
Noerr and restoring First Amendment analysis. However, because our under-
standings of business and economics tend to evolve over time, if there is one 
area of federal law where stare decisis has held little weight, it is antitrust. 
Relying on such evolving understandings over the last 30 years, the Supreme 
Court has overruled major opinions across the board, even opinions that 
once set the rules of the road for commerce, such as the per se bans on retail 
price maintenance and vertical price fixing.73
Here, the problem of the “moth-eaten” foundations of Noerr are import-
ant. Noerr may not be entirely naive, but it was written before the dramatic 
increases in lobbying budgets that occurred in the 21st century and the 
broad understanding of the private influence on legislatures.74 In the same 
sense that changing economic understanding caused the courts to overrule 
some of its per se rules, the changing understandings of political influence 
have changed the circumstances under which Noerr’s viability should be 
understood.
We can add to this, finally, that longstanding reliance by parties—the 
usual reason for declining to overrule a case—should not be a major factor 
in this case. The reason is that the First Amendment would remain to protect 
16 KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE
core political activities; indeed, political advocates are already constantly 
relying on the First Amendment. What would be newly subject to antitrust 
liability is conduct like bribery, fraud, or deception of government. But it 
seems hard to imagine that parties can be said to have reasonably relied on 
Noerr to immunize conduct that is malum in se.
The better approach, both in terms of fidelity to congressional intent 
and the need to reduce the variation among lower courts, is to overrule Noerr 
and ask defendants to rely on the First Amendment should they believe their 
speech or petitioning is constitutionally protected. This overruling of Noerr 
could be accomplished by the Supreme Court. But it could also be accom-
plished by Congress. In the course of antitrust reform, Congress can specify 
that Noerr immunity, to the extent that it is not based on the Constitution, 
is overruled. If Congress wanted, it could also create particular exemptions 
for political organizing at the same time.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A REPLACEMENT 
FOR NOERR
In the absence of Noerr, the defendant who claims to be petition-ing government or expressing political views would not be left helpless. Instead, such a defendant would raise the First Amendment as a defense, 
as is typical in other areas of the law.75 This section considers, briefly, what 
such a defense might look like in practice.
A defendant engaged in concerted anticompetitive activities that involve 
the government would defend itself by asserting that it is engaged in polit-
ical speech, petitioning, or both. Faced with such a defense, the court has 
two main questions to consider. First, was the defendant in fact engaged 
in speech or petitioning or, instead, in some category of conduct, such as 
bribery, deception of an agency, abuse of process, or other such categories? 
Second, if the defendant was engaged in protected speech or expressive con-
duct, do the government’s interests—understood as preventing monopolistic 
corruption of the political process—outweigh those interests?
As the first step suggests, an important doctrinal tool in a First Amend-
ment defense of Noerr-like conduct is the distinction between speech and 
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conduct, a familiar First Amendment trope most famously associated with 
Holmes’s example of shouting “Fire!” in a crowded theater. As implied by 
that example, the Court has never taken everything that could be construed 
as “speech” to be protected expression under the First Amendment. Many 
so-called speech acts, such as true threats, criminal conspiracy, harmful lies, 
and most procedural court filings are not granted protection as speech under 
the First Amendment.76 Hence, a defendant who claims that their conduct, 
otherwise illegal under the Sherman Act, is in fact protected speech would 
need to demonstrate that what is claimed as speech enjoys protection at all.77
Much anticompetitive speech would still be protected. The railroad 
company that expresses its passionate support for climate change laws, 
knowing that such laws will disadvantage the trucking industry, is protected 
by the First Amendment. In fact, even if the industry supports such measures 
because emission requirements might hurt its competitors, it would still 
be engaged in protected speech—the premise being that it is participating 
in the debate. But a company that issues false statements in a government 
proceeding to hurt a competitor or competition is not protected, as in the 
example of the oil company that lies about its patents to a state agency for-
mulating a regulation,78 or the filing of false claims to the FDA to attempt to 
extend the life of a patent.79 That kind of claim could be decided by United 
States v. Gilliland,80 which affirmed that intentionally false declarations to 
the government are unprotected by the First Amendment. The Court held 
that it was legitimate to protect “agencies from the perversion which might 
result from the deceptive practices described,”81 and prosecutions for such 
lies are now routine.
A similar analysis obtains for bribery. Bribery can be thought of as a form 
of expressive conduct in the same way that the assassination of a political 
figure might be. But if the courts sometimes take a very narrow view of brib-
ery, they have not been willing to afford a constitutional defense to those 
convicted of bribery.82
It is important to understand how this analysis would differ from the 
invoking of Noerr’s sham exception. As it stands, the sham exception has 
been limited by the Supreme Court to a form of conduct unprotected by the 
First Amendment (purely baseless abuse of process). The court using existing 
First Amendment analysis would necessarily be forced to consider whether 
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other forms of expressive conduct, like bribery or deceit, are protected or not.83
Even if they are not engaged in protected speech, antitrust defendants 
might argue, alternatively, that they were engaged in petitioning, which is 
separately protected by the First Amendment. But to invoke this defense, the 
defendant would have to demonstrate that what they were doing was actually 
petitioning. As the FTC puts it, petitioning is not “all activity involving com-
munication with the government” but is limited to a “request to a government 
decision maker to exercise its discretion to decide in a certain way.”84
Consequently, the manufacturer who petitions the Department of Com-
merce for an exception to a steel tariff is protected by the Constitution. (Many 
forms of lobbying would likely be protected as well, although strictly speak-
ing the Court has yet to explicitly rule that lobbying amounts to protected 
petitioning.)85 But there is such a thing as a communication with government 
that is not a petition.86 For example, purely ministerial or procedural filings 
over which the government exercises no discretion are not good-faith efforts 
to persuade the government of anything.87 Similarly, the party who lies to the 
patent office in a patent application has indeed tried to influence government 
in their favor, but in a form that cannot be termed a legitimate petition.88
The First Amendment protections afforded to litigation would remain 
a slightly complex matter. The Supreme Court has, under the First Amend-
ment, protected the activities of lawyers, at least when “[r]esort[ing] to the 
courts to seek vindication of constitutional rights.”89 The Court has also 
said that “the Petition Clause protects the right of individuals to appeal to 
courts and other forums established by the government for resolution of 
legal disputes.”90 That and the protection granted litigation under existing 
Noerr doctrine would tend to suggest a baseline of constitutional protection 
for suits that are allegedly filed for anticompetitive purposes. That said, the 
constitutional protection afforded litigation is obviously limited. Courts have 
long felt themselves free to punish lawyers who bring frivolous suits, lie to 
the court during litigation, or induce perjury. Hence, baseless or repetitive 
litigation brought purely for harassment purposes would be unprotected.
19ANTITRUST AND CORRUPTION
CONCLUSION
Corruption of government and private gaming of regulatory process are broadly felt concerns. In that context, the Noerr decision’s foundations look increasingly dubious. As efforts to narrow Noerr 
have not succeeded, the overruling of Noerr by the courts or Congress is an 
important step. 
I do not deny—who could?—the possibility that the First Amendment 
doctrine is capable of its own doctrinal creep. But the problem with avoid-
ance creep is that the underlying justifications of both the statute and the 
Constitution go unexamined, as the doctrine takes on a life of its own. When 
First Amendment doctrine creeps, its consequences are broader. For exam-
ple, a decision immunizing false statements in agency proceedings under 
the First Amendment, even if in an antitrust case, would necessarily have 
broader effects. Under Noerr, such concerns can be isolated and ignored in 
the cloud of immunity that the doctrine has created. And that is why, among 
other reasons, that Noerr should be overruled.
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